Recent evidence suggests that deep neural networks (DNNs) are vulnerable to adversarial examples, which are crafted by adding human-imperceptible perturbations to legitimate examples. However, most of the existing adversarial attacks generate adversarial examples with weak transferability, making it difficult to evaluate the robustness of DNNs under the challenging black-box setting. To address this issue, we propose two methods: Nesterov momentum iterative fast gradient sign method (N-MI-FGSM) and scale-invariant attack method (SIM), to improve the transferability of adversarial examples. N-MI-FGSM tries a better optimizer by applying the idea of Nesterov accelerated gradient to gradient-based attack method. SIM leverages the scale-invariant property of DNNs and optimizes the generated adversarial example by a set of scaled images as the inputs. Further, the two methods can be naturally combined to form a strong attack and enhance existing gradient attack methods. Empirical results on ImageNet and NIPS 2017 adversarial competition show that the proposed methods can generate adversarial examples with higher transferability than existing competing baselines.
INTRODUCTION
Despite the great success on various machine learning tasks, deep neural networks (DNNs) have been shown to be vulnerable to adversarial examples Szegedy et al., 2014) . Such adversarial examples are generated by adding human-imperceptible perturbations to the legitimate examples, but lead to misclassification by DNNs. An intriguing property of adversarial examples is the transferability where adversarial examples generated by one model can fool a different model. Learning how to generate adversarial examples has gathered an increasing attention, since the adversarial examples can help evaluate the robustness of DNNs (Arnab et al., 2018) , but they also improve the robustness of DNNs by adversarial training Madry et al., 2017; Tramr et al., 2018) .
Several attack methods have been proposed recently to generate adversarial examples such as onestep attack methods and iterative attack methods (Kurakin et al., 2016; . With the knowledge of a deep model, i.e. in the white-box setting, these attack methods can achieve high success rates. However, they show low success rates for black-box attacks where we know nothing about the models, especially for those with a defense mechanism such as adversarial training Madry et al., 2017; Tramr et al., 2018) and input transformation (Guo et al., 2018; . It indicates that most existing attack methods can not generate adversarial examples with good transferability, making it difficult to evaluate the robustness of DNNs under the challenging black-box setting.
In this paper, we propose to improve the transferability of adversarial examples by two methods: Nesterov momentum iterative fast gradient sign method and scale-invariant attack method. Inspired by the fact that Nesterov accelerated gradient (Nesterov, 1983 ) is superior to momentum for conventionally difficult optimization objectives (Sutskever et al., 2013) . We propose to apply the idea of Nesterov accelerated gradient (Nesterov, 1983) to the momentum iterative fast gradient sign methods to boost the success rate of the generated adversarial examples. Specifically, we make a jump in the direction of previous accumulated gradient before computing gradient in each iteration when generating adversarial examples. We name this method as Nesterov momentum iterative fast gradient sign method (N-MI-FGSM). Additionally, we find that DNNs are supposed to have the scale-invariant property. Based on this discovery, we propose a simple and effective approach to improve the transferability of adversarial examples. Inspired by the works of Xie et al. (2019) and Dong et al. (2019) , we suggest to optimize an adversarial example using a set of scaled images. By using a set of scaled images, we actually generate adversarial examples that are robust to different biases of the model. Denote this method the scale-invariant attack method (SIM). By combining the proposed methods with existing gradient-based attack method (e.g., diverse input method (Xie et al., 2019) , etc.), we can further boost the success rates of the generated adversarial examples.
Extensive experiments on the ImageNet dataset (Russakovsky et al., 2015) show that our methods yield signification higher success rates than existing baseline attacks. Our best attack method, SI-N-TI-DIM (Scale-Invariant Nesterov momentum iterative FGSM integrated with translation-invariant diverse input method) , reaches an average success rate of 96.1% (see Table 3 ) against adversarial trained models under black-box setting. To further show the effectiveness, we evaluate our attack method by attacking the top-3 defense solutions from NIPS 2017 adversarial competition . The results show that our attack method can generate adversarial examples with much higher transferability than the top-1 attack approach of the NIPS2017 adversarial competition and the current strongest attack methods (see Table 4 ).
RELATED WORK
We first specify some notations used in this paper. Let x denote a clean image, and y true the corresponding target label. Let J(x, y true ) denote the loss function of the classifier, such as the cross-entropy loss. Let x adv denote the adversarial example generated from x, whose goal is to maximize the loss J(x adv , y true ), under the constraint that x adv is indistinguishable from x and the corresponding predicted label y adv = y true . In this work, we use L ∞ norm to measure the distortion between x adv and x, x adv − x ∞ ≤ ǫ, where ǫ is the magnitude of adversarial perturbation.
ATTACK METHODS
There are several gradient-based attack methods proposed to generate adversarial examples.
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM). FGSM generates an adversarial example x adv by maximizing the loss function J(x adv , y true ) and performing a one-step update as
where sign(·) function forces the perturbation to meet the L ∞ norm bound.
Iterative Fast Gradient Sign Method (I-FGSM). Kurakin et al. (2016) extend FGSM to an iterative version by applying a fast gradient update for multiple times with a small step size α.
where Clip ǫ x (·) function restricts the generated adversarial examples x adv t to be within the ǫ-ball of x. Here t is the iteration number and α is the step size.
Momentum Iterative Fast Gradient Sign Method (MI-FGSM). propose to integrate momentum into the iterative attack method and result in higher transferability of the ad-versarial examples. The update procedure is as follows:
where g t is the accumulated gradient at iteration t and µ is the decay factor of g t .
Diverse Input Method (DIM). Xie et al. (2019) propose to apply random transformations T (·) to the input images with a probability p at each iteration. The transformations include random resizing and random padding. DIM can be naturally integrated into other gradient based attack methods to further improve the transferability of adversarial examples.
Translation-Invariant Method (TIM). Instead of optimizing the adversarial example on a single image, Dong et al. (2019) propose to use a set of translated images to optimize an adversarial example. They further develop an efficient algorithm to calculate the gradients by convolving the gradient at untranslated images with a kernel matrix W . TIM can be naturally integrated with other gradient based attack methods to further improve the transferability of adversarial examples. The combination of TIM and DIM, called TI-DIM, is the current strongest black-box attack methods.
DEFENSE METHODS
Various defense methods have been proposed to against adversarial examples, which can be classified as two types. They either modify the training process, or modify the input data.
One intuitive defense is adversarial training, which augments the training data by the generated adversarial examples during the training process Szegedy et al., 2014) . Tramr et al. (2018) propose ensemble adversarial training, which augments the training data with perturbations transferred from other models, to further improve the robustness of the model to against adversarial examples.
The second type of defense methods aims to mitigate the effects of adversarial attacks by modifying the input data. Guo et al. (2018) discover that there exists a range of image transformations that have the potential to remove adversarial perturbations while preserving the visual information of the images. mitigate adversarial effects through randomized transformations. use high-level representation guided denoiser to purify the adversarial images.
METHODOLOGY

MOTIVATION
In analogy to the training of a deep neural network, the process of generating an adversarial example can also be attributed to an optimization problem. The model used to generate adversarial examples can be seen as the training data and the adversarial example can be seen as the model to be trained. We can think of the transferability of the adversarial example as being analogous to the generalization ability of the deep network. Thus, we can migrate methods used to improve the generalization of neural networks to the task of generating adversarial examples for improving the transferability.
Various methods have been proposed to improve the generalization ability of deep networks, which can be split to two aspects: (1) trying a better optimizer such as Adam (Kingma & Ba, 2014) , (2) adopting data augmentation (Krizhevsky et al., 2012; Simonyan & Zisserman, 2014) . Correspondingly, some methods to improve the transferability of adversarial examples can also be split to two aspects: (1) trying a better optimizer, such as MI-FGSM that applies the idea of momentum, (2) adopting model augmentation, such as that attacks multiple models simultaneously.
Based on above analysis, we aim to improve the transferability of adversarial examples by using a better optimizer that applies the idea of Nesterov accelerated gradient and introducing a new model augmentation method that uses a set of scaled images to optimize an adversarial example.
NESTEROV MOMENTUM ITERATIVE FAST GRADIENT SIGN METHOD
Nesterov Accelerated Gradient (NAG) (Nesterov, 1983 ) is a technique to have the momentum term as a kind of prescience by updating the parameters with the momentum before computing the gradient. Sutskever et al. (2013) show that NAG can be rewritten as an improved momentum method.
It has been shown that some classical gradient descent algorithms can be integrated into the gradientbased attack methods and improve the transferability of adversarial examples. first apply the idea of momentum (Polyak, 1964) to the gradient-based attack methods. By integrating momentum into the iterative FGSM, their attack method can stabilize the update directions and escape from poor local maximum, thus significantly improve the success rate of adversarial attacks.
Compared to the momentum method, the anticipatory update of NAG can prevent us from going too fast and result in increased responsiveness. Sutskever et al. (2013) provide empirical evidence that NAG is superior to momentum for conventionally difficult optimization objectives. We apply the idea of NAG to the gradient-based attack methods and generate adversarial examples with higher transferability.
We can naturally integrate NAG into the momentum iterative fast gradient sign method to form a better adversarial attack method, namely Nesterov momentum iterative fast gradient sign method (N-MI-FGSM). Start with g 0 = 0, the update procedure for N-MI-FGSM can be written as:
where x nes t updates the adversarial example with momentum before computing the gradient.
SCALE-INVARIANT ATTACK METHOD
We can also improve the transferability of adversarial examples by model augmentation. We first formulate the concepts of loss-preserving transformation and model augmentation as follows.
Definition 1 Loss-preserving Transformation. Given an input x with ground-truth label y true and a model f (x) : x ∈ X → y ∈ Y with the cross-entropy loss J(x, y), if there is an input transformation T (·) that satisfies J(T (x), y true ) ≈ J(x, y true ) for any x ∈ X , we call it a loss-preserving transformation. Intuitively, we can improve the transferability of an adversarial example by providing more models as its training data. improve the adversarial attack success rate by attacking an ensemble of models. However, their approach requires training or obtaining a set of different models, which adds engineering complexity and is hard to extend. In this work, we propose to employ the model augmentation, which is a simple way of augmenting the models via the losspreserving transformation.
We discover that deep neural networks are supposed to have the scale-invariant property. Specifically, the loss values are very similar for the original and scaled images for the deep model (which is empirically validated in Section 4.2). The scale operation can be served as a model augmentation method with loss-preserving transformation.
Driven by the above analysis, we propose a Scale-Invariant attack Method (SIM), which uses a set of scaled images to optimize the generated adversarial example:
arg max
where S i (x) = 1/2 i · x is a scale operation that scales the input image x with a scale factor 1/2 i and m is the size of scaled images. With this method, we can effectively enlarge the models and generate adversarial examples with higher transferability.
Consider a layer z = σ(W u + b), where u is the input of the current layer, W the weight matrix, b the bias vector, and σ(·) the RELU activation function. If we apply a scale operation to the input u with a scale factor β, then we can get z ′ = σ(W βu + b) = βσ(W u + b/β). It indicates we actually change the bias of the model by applying the scale operation to the input image. Intuitively, this method can also be interpreted as generating adversarial examples robust to various biases.
ATTACK ALGORITHM
We regard NAG as an optimizer and the scale-invariant attack as a model augmentation. The two methods can be naturally combined to form a stronger attack, namely SI-N-MI-FGSM (ScaleInvariant Nesterov Momentum Iterative Fast Gradient Sign Method). The overall SI-N-MI-FGSM attack algorithm is summarized in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 SI-N-MI-FGSM
Input: A clean example x with ground-truth label y true ; a classifier f with loss function J; Input: Perturbation size ǫ; maximum iterations T ; scales m and decay factor µ. 
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we provide experimental evidence on the advantage of the proposed methods.We first provide the setup of the experiment, explore the scale invariant (SI) property, and do ablation study on the two proposed methods, NAG and SI, against MI-FGSM to show that they can both boost the attack performance. Then in Section 4.4 and 4.5, we show that our methods can be combined with the current strongest attacks, DIM (Xie et al., 2019) , TIM (Dong et al., 2019) and their combination of TI-DIM, and boost the average attack success rate under single-model and multi-model settings.
In the end, we further show the advantage of the proposed method with the top3 defense solutions from the NIPS 2017 adversarial competition.
EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
Dataset. We randomly choose 1000 images belonging to the 1000 categories from the ILSVRC 2012 validation set that are already correctly classified by all the models we test on.
Models. We consider seven models. Four of which are normally trained models, Inception-v3 (Incv3) (Szegedy et al., 2016) , Inception-v4 (Inc-v4), Inception-Resnet-v2 (IncRes-v2) (Szegedy et al., 2017) , and Resnet-v2-101 (Res-101) (He et al., 2016) . The other three are adversarially trained models, Inc-v3 ens3 , Inc-v3 ens4 , and IncRes-v2 ens (Tramr et al., 2018) .
Baselines. We first verify the effectiveness of each component of SI-N-MI-FGSM via an ablation study by compared with MI-FGSM . We then integrate the proposed SI-N-MI-FGSM with DIM (Xie et al., 2019) , TIM, and TI-DIM (Dong et al., 2019) , to further show the effectiveness of the proposed method. Denote the attacks combined with SI-N-MI-FGSM as SI-N-DIM, SI-N-TIM, and SI-N-TIM-DIM, respectively.
Hyper-parameters. For the settings of hyper-parameters, we follow the settings in with the maximum perturbation as ǫ = 16, the number of iteration as 10, and the step size as α = 1.6. For MI-FGSM, we adopt the default decay factor µ = 1.0. For DIM, the transformation probability is set to 0.5. For TIM, we adopt the Gaussian kernel and the size of the kernel is set to 7 × 7. For SI-N-MI-FGSM, we set the scales m in Algorithm 1 as m = 5.
SCALE-INVARIANT PROPERTY
We first verify the scale-invariant property of deep neural networks. We use the original 1,000 images from the dataset and let the scale be in range 0.1 to 2.0 with a step size of 0.1. We feed the original images as well as the scaled images into Inc-v3, Inc-v4, IncRes-2, and Res-101, respectively. We then average the loss of the models over all scaled images at each scale size. The loss curves are illustrated in Figure 1 .
We can see that the loss curves are smooth ans stable when the scale size is in 0.1 to 1.0. So we assume that the scale-invariant property is held within the range of 0.1 to 1.0, and the scale transformations with scale size at 0.1 to 1.0 is a loss-preserving transformation. Thus, we can perform the scale transformation to the input images as a model augmentation. Table 1. The two proposed methods, N-MI-FGSM and SI-MI-FGSM, can both improve the success rate on the seven models, and combining both as the SI-N-MI-FGSM can further improve the success rate. The final SI-N-MI-FGSM reaches an average success rate of 56.6%, which outperforms the baseline attack of MI-FSGM by a large margin of 21.5%, validating the effectiveness of the proposed method. 
ATTACK A SINGLE MODEL
We now compare the success rate of TIM with SI-N-TIM, DIM with SI-N-DIM, TI-DIM with SI-N-TI-DIM respectively by attacking a single model. The comparisons are in Table 2a to Table 2c respectively. Our methods outperform all other baseline attacks by a large margin under the blackbox setting, and achieve a nearly 100% success rate under the white-box setting. For example, in Table 2a , if the adversarial examples are crafted for Inc-v3, SI-N-TIM has a success rate of 74.7% and 50.3% on Inc-v4 and Inc-v3 ens3 , respectively, while TIM (a strong baseline attack) only obtains a success rate of 47.8% and 24.0%, respectively. In general, our methods consistently outperform the baseline attacks by 10% ∼ 35% under the black-box setting. 
ATTACK AN ENSEMBLE OF MODELS
In this subsection, we follow the strategy of (Liu et al., 2016) to attack multiple models simultaneously in order to further improve the transferability. We attack an ensemble of Inc-v3, Inc-v4, IncRes-v2, and Res-101 with equal weights using TIM, SI-N-TIM, DIM, SI-N-DIM, TI-DIM, and SI-N-TI-DIM, respectively. The results are summarized in Table 3 , where attacks against four normal trained models are white-box and attacks against three adversarial trained models are black-box.
The proposed methods improve the success rates across all experiments over the baseline attacks. In general, our methods consistently outperform the baseline attacks by 10% ∼ 40% under the black-box setting. In particular, when using SI-N-TI-DIM, the combination of our methods and TI-DIM, we can fool the adversarial trained models with an average success rate of 96.1%. It further demonstrates the effectiveness of the proposed methods and the vulnerability of DNNs. We further show the effectiveness of the proposed method by attacking the top-3 defense solutions from the NIPS 2017 adversarial competition. These are high-level representation guided denoiser (HGD, rank-1) , input transformation though random resizing and padding (R&P, rank-2) , and rank-3 submission (NIPS-r3) 1 .
We compare SI-N-TI-DIM with MI-FGSM (top-1 attack solution in the NIPS competition) and TI-DIM (state-of-the-art attack method). We first generate adversarial examples for the ensemble of Inc-v3, Inc-v4, IncRes-v2, and Res-101 using MI-FGSM (rank-1 attack solutions from NIPS 2017 adversarial competition), TI-DIM (SOTA adversarial attack), and SI-N-TI-DIM (our best attack method), respectively. Then, we use the generated adversarial examples to attack the top-3 defense solutions. The results are summarized in Table 4 . The proposed SI-N-TI-DIM reaches an average success rate of 96.2%, which outperforms the state-of-the-art attack method by a large margin of 15.9%. The results show that the proposed attack method can fool not only adversarial trained models but also the existing strongest defense mechanism, only based on the transferability of adversarial examples. It further demonstrates the effectiveness of our proposed attack method. 
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we propose two attack methods, N-MI-FGSM and SIM, to improve the transferability of adversarial examples. N-MI-FGSM optimizes the generated adversarial example by Nesterov accelerated gradient, and SIM optimizes the generated adversarial example by a set of scaled images as the inputs. Moreover, the two methods can be naturally combined to build a stronger attack. By integrating the proposed methods into baseline attacks, we can further improve the transferability of adversarial examples. Compared with the baseline attacks, the results on ImageNet show that the proposed final method earns significantly higher success rates under the black-box setting. The proposed SI-N-TI-DIM can fool the adversarial trained models at an average success rate of 96.1% only based on the transferability of adversarial examples. By evaluating our method against top-3 defense solution from NIPS 2017 adversarial competition, our method achieves an average success rate of 96.2%, which outperforms the state-of-the-art attack method by a large margin.
The results show that previous defense methods are actually not robust. They just defense against existing attack methods. By using more advanced techniques such as Nesterov accelerated gradient and scale invariance in this paper, we can fool them. A further direction can be design provably robust learning algorithms and our methods can serve as a strong benchmark for evaluating the robustness of learning algorithms.
